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Abstract
The European Green Deal (EGD) is an ambitious strategy. However, significant events, incidents, and demands, from demo‐
cratic backsliding in the EU to the Covid‐19 pandemic, are causing the ground to shift underfoot. These events go beyond
ordinary changes or even individual crises, cumulatively fuelling a “new normal” of turbulence for the EU, encompass‐
ing rapid, unpredictable changes. This turbulence can help and hinder policy design and implementation, requiring policy
actors to think outside the box and beyond the status quo. This article investigates how the European Commission and
other key actors can engage effectively with turbulence to ensure the successful delivery and implementation of the EGD.
The first half of the article strengthens and adapts turbulent governance literature (Ansell & Trondal, 2018). It delineates
how turbulence differs from crisis; expands the forms of turbulence to include horizontal scalar and policy turbulence, as
well as its transversal attribute; and shifts the focus to governing with turbulence rather than against turbulence. The sec‐
ond half undertakes an initial analysis of the EGD in light of turbulence and provides a springboard for further investigations
within this thematic issue and beyond. It is apparent that the EGD is both responding and contributing to a varied landscape
of turbulence. Policy actors must identify and understand the sources of turbulence—including their transversal nature
and the potential for responses to increase turbulence—if they are to effectively govern with turbulence.
Keywords
crisis; environmental governance; environmental turbulence; European Green Deal; organisational turbulence; policy
turbulence; scalar turbulence
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Climate Governance and the European Green Deal in Turbulent Times” edited by Claire
Dupont (Ghent University, Belgium) and Diarmuid Torney (Dublin City University, Ireland).
© 2021 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu‐
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
The European Green Deal (EGD) has become the cen‐
tral tenet of the von der Leyen Commission, setting
out a holistic approach towards the climate and bio‐
diversity crises with policies ranging from agriculture
and food to a circular economy. It is both an overarch‐
ing set of priorities of the new European Commission
(hereafter Commission)—a communication published in
December 2019 as it took office (European Commission,
2019b)—and the ensuing legislative and administrative
agenda of 47 key actions. These span seven substan‐
tive themes: climate ambition; clean, affordable, and
secure energy; industrial strategy for a clean and cir‐
cular economy; sustainable and smart mobility; green‐
ing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)/“Farm to
Fork”; preserving and protecting biodiversity; and mov‐
ing towards a zero‐pollution ambition for a toxic free
environment. To achieve this, the EGD promotes three
procedural themes: mainstreaming sustainability in all
EU policies, pushing for the EU to be a global leader and
working together across levels, and policy areas for a
European Climate Pact (European Commission, 2019a).
Alongside its environmental ambition, it has a clear focus
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on “just transition,” e.g., to avoid massive unemploy‐
ment in carbon‐intensive industries overnight (European
Commission, 2019b). The EGD therefore appears to pro‐
mote an inclusive vision of sustainability with emphasis
on a “just transition” that would leave “no one behind”
(European Commission, 2019b, p.16). It pushes bound‐
aries and proposes major changes beyond what the EU
has attempted previously, including the key ambition
of making Europe the first carbon‐neutral continent by
2050. However, the EU is seeking to achieve this not
merely in the face of crises but in the context of signif‐
icant turbulence (Oberthür et al., 2016).
This article draws upon Ansell and co‐authors’ under‐
standing of turbulence, which they define as “interac‐
tions of events or demands that are highly variable,
inconsistent, unexpected or unpredictable” (Ansell et al.,
2016, p. 3). They distinguish turbulence from crisis by
drawing on notions of “shifting parameters,” “intercur‐
rence,” and “temporal complexity” (Ansell & Trondal,
2018, p. 45). Shifting parameters—the idea that “the
ground is in motion” (Ansell & Trondal, 2018, p. 45)—
means turbulence aims not to capture the crisis response
of stable political systems, but instead the “increasingly
volatile context for complex problem‐solving” (Ansell
et al., 2020, p. 3). Intercurrence concerns “unexpected
institutional entanglement” (Ansell & Trondal, 2018,
p. 45)which grows between normally independent levels
and organisations when decision‐makers try to respond
to turbulence. These entanglements can be understood
as “interplays” between institutions, “situations in which
one institution affects the development or performance
of another institution” (from the local to the global lev‐
els), ranging from “disruptive” to “synergetic” (Oberthür
& Stokke, 2011, p. 4). While interplays are common
and often managed, the growing number of institutions
and their fluctuating mandates can lead to unexpected
entanglements. Finally, temporal complexity captures
theway decision‐makers are put under strain by different
and competing time horizons (Ansell & Trondal, 2018).
When the three facets of shifting parameters, intercur‐
rence, and temporal complexity combine, turbulence
flourishes. The turbulence imbues the system, weaving
its way through until it becomes the “new normal” or
new landscape for political systems—to a similar extent
that “rapid change and unpredictability in both the mar‐
ket and technology standards” is part of the business
environment of many firms (Yun et al., 2019, p. 218). It is
the point the UK has reached when delivering Brexit—
a radical departure which destabilises policy, politics,
and polity (Burns et al., 2019). It is also where the EU,
which has faced repeated crises (Falkner, 2016; Rhinard,
2019), has now arrived—bringing both challenges and
opportunities for the EGD and its ambitions.
This article addresses the question of how the
Commission and other key actors can engage effectively
with turbulence to ensure the successful delivery and
implementation of the EGD, as an ambitious policy that
arises in a turbulent landscape. It seeks tomake both the‐
oretical and practical contributions. The article (1) teases
out the features that distinguish turbulence from cri‐
sis. It then (2) develops an enhanced conceptual frame‐
work focused on turbulence, building on Ansell and co‐
authors’ work. It outlines the need to governwith rather
than against turbulence; categorises the different forms
of turbulence; and discusses the need to foster transfor‐
mative actions towards durable policies. This provides
an analytical foundation for the remainder of this article
and also for this thematic issue. The article then applies
this framework to undertake a preliminary analysis of
the EGD. It (3) maps the four categories of turbulence
on to the EGD, before (4) highlighting potential path‐
ways and key challenges in developing and implement‐
ing the EGD in the face of turbulence, with a focus on
Covid‐19 and greening the CAP. As highlighted through‐
out this thematic issue, the EGD and the steps to imple‐
ment it have the potential to be transformative, but
with numerous challenges and pitfalls to be addressed.
Not only is the EGD arising in the context of turbulence,
it can be understood as both a response to, and a con‐
tributor to, turbulence at the EU level. If policy actors
are effectively to govern with turbulence and thereby
ensure the successful delivery and implementation of
the EGD, they must identify and understand the sources
of turbulence—including their transversal nature and
the potential for responses to increase turbulence.
2. Differentiating Between Turbulence and Crisis
The EU has lived through many crises—indeed, Monnet
famously argued that “Europe will be forged in crises,
and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those
crises” (Monnet, 1976, as cited in Guiso et al., 2014, p. 1).
This affinity between the EU and crisis—and between EU
scholarship and crisis—may lead to concept overstretch‐
ing and thus the need to clearly define what is and is not
a crisis. At the heart of the concept of crisis is the exis‐
tence of ordinary, non‐crisis time—a crisis is an acute,
extreme event which may ultimately be resolved leading
to another period of calm (Saurugger, 2014). However,
in recent years the EU has been beset by a multitude of
crises, what Falkner termed “a conglomerate of specific
but interconnected crises” (2016, p. 220). This begs the
question ofwhen, if ever, the EU can return to normal—if
even “normal” makes sense for an ever‐changing polity
(Laffan et al., 2000). A recent questioning of what nor‐
mal in the EU context means is Rhinard’s work on crisifi‐
cation (2019). He found a growing number of dedicated
crisis‐scanning and crisis‐managing institutions leading
to a newmode of crisis policymaking operating alongside
normal policymaking. Rhinard’s crisification outlines how
at least part of the EU’s apparatus always operates in “cri‐
sis mode,” even though normal policymaking continues
in other areas.
Conceptualising the EU as experiencing turbulence
goes a step further. Ansell et al. (2020) differenti‐
ate between turbulence and routine—turbulence has
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long been considered the exception, not the norm, yet
recently “the balance between the routine and the tur‐
bulent has shifted and we have been slow to catch up”
(p. 3). This, we argue, is particularly true for the EU.
We start from the premise that there is no returning
to “normal” time in between times of “crisis.” The bal‐
ance has shifted so that the ever‐changing turbulent con‐
text is the “new normal” (Ansell & Trondal, 2018, p. 53),
the new routine—turbulence is pervasive throughout
the whole EU system (no policy area is isolated from its
effects). While Rhinard (2019) focuses on the impact on
EU decision‐making with crisification, turbulence adopts
a broader scope, considering the interplay with other
policy areas and levels of governance. Furthermore, the
conceptual shift to turbulence is also a normative shift,
as crisis has negative connotations—”threaten[ing] the
high‐priority goals” (Saurugger, 2014, p. 181)—whereas
turbulence may also be positive.
Crises may contribute to turbulence but the two
concepts are distinct. A practical example may provide
some clarity here. A once‐off magnitude 8 earthquake,
Pompeii‐scale of volcanic eruption or resulting tsunami
is a crisis for the affected populations and leads to
emergency responses to survive that singular incident.
However, a location that is subjected to repeated mid‐
level earthquakes or volcanic ash clouds, with occa‐
sional ones of greater intensity (including crisis‐level
ones), is subject to turbulence and requires a response
that enables those affected to live with the turbulence,
whether this be to change the structural design of build‐
ings, what crops are grown (e.g., those with short lifecy‐
cles or benefiting from ash), or otherwise. Consequently,
being able to identify sources of turbulence—and not
only crises—and tailor appropriate responses is an essen‐
tial part of the governance toolkit.
3. A Framework for Turbulent Times
As noted, turbulence entails a new normal that encom‐
passes shifting parameters, intercurrence, and tempo‐
ral complexity. Whilst traditional approaches to gover‐
nance or decision‐making may be effective in the dol‐
drums or even for individual crises, a tailored framework
is needed in the context of turbulence. To respond effec‐
tively to turbulence, policy actors need to be able to iden‐
tify and understand (1) the over‐arching goal of gover‐
nance in the context of turbulence; (2) specific instances
and sources of turbulence; and (3) suitable responses to
the turbulence. Consequently, this section outlines a con‐
ceptual framework to achieve this analysis, building on
and adapting the work of Ansell and co‐authors to the
EU context.
3.1. Steering Through Turbulence: Governing With and
not Against Turbulence?
Turbulence generally does not prevent the functioning
of decision‐making or governance, but it does pose con‐
siderable challenges for policy actors. It raises questions
such as how to achieve existing goals or ambitions in a
new context, or indeed whether those goals themselves
need to be adapted. Does one try to patch the existing
systems and regimes, throw in the towel, or undertake a
substantial overhaul? Is it a matter of addressing a single,
temporary instance of turbulence or attempting to insu‐
late and prepare for future occurrences? What mecha‐
nisms could be of help?
Ansell and Trondal (2018) outline four potential
dilemmas that policy actors may be faced with in the
context of turbulence: stability vs. change; anticipation
vs. resilience; tight(er) coupling vs. decoupling; and inte‐
gration vs. differentiation. Whilst the dilemmas are use‐
ful considerations for policy actors, they highlight amore
fundamental issue for actors: whether to govern against
or with turbulence.
Governing against turbulence is focused on fixing the
symptoms of turbulence and bypassing it asmuch as pos‐
sible, in order to focus on the original aims andobjectives.
The purpose is to identify and address specific issues as
a sort of patch job in the short‐term. It also hopefully cre‐
ates some general stability and consistency initially, pro‐
viding space and time to focus on the long‐term. In con‐
trast, governing with turbulence entails acknowledging
we may not be able to fully understand or prepare for
turbulence—that it will reoccur in a new formulation
or form.
Overall, governing against turbulence may work in
the short term (and may even be desirable to ensure
some stability and achieve specific goals). But as turbu‐
lence is an ongoing, developing condition where indeed
more unpredictable turbulent events may occur, the
system becomes increasingly stressed and subject to
pressures, breakdown, and ruptures. As such, a shift
to governing with turbulence is essential. The purpose
of governing with turbulence is to build in flexibil‐
ity, dynamism, resilience, and enable policy actors to
respond more effectively to changes and overall tur‐
bulence in the future. Consequently, even if initially
policy actors seek to govern against turbulence, in
the long‐term only governance with turbulence can be
viable. Building such capacity brings considerable chal‐
lenges as highlighted in Section 3.3, but first the policy
actors must be able to identify sources of turbulence.
3.2. Sources of Turbulence
Building on earlier work in administration studies (e.g.,
Cameron et al., 1987), Ansell et al. (2016) conceptu‐
alise three different forms of turbulence which matter
from a governance perspective, each impacting on, and
impacted by, public organisations and institutions: organ‐
isational, environmental, and scalar. Organisational tur‐
bulence deals with turbulence within organisations and
institutions, such as major administrative reform, staff
conflict, or turnover. At EU level, this would cover,
for example, tensions within the Commission ranks
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following repeated administrative reforms over the last
20 years (Kassim et al., 2013), and for climate action
especially, the creation of DG CLIMA in 2010 and further
reorganisation under President Juncker (Bürgin, 2020).
Environmental turbulence concerns contextual, external
forms of turbulence, from the Covid‐19 pandemic to the
ongoing climate and biodiversity emergencies. Scalar tur‐
bulence is of particular importance to multi‐level poli‐
ties such as the EU. It concerns the impact that deci‐
sions at one level can have on another level. As Ansell
and Trondal (2018) argue, “a ‘good’ solution at one
level might be considered a ‘bad’ solution at another
level” (p. 46). This turbulence covers both intended
and unintended consequences of multi‐level decision‐
making, exposing the interdependence and interplay of
the different decision centres (Oberthür & Stokke, 2011).
Ansell and Trondal (2018) limit themselves to the above
three forms of turbulence, yet these are arguably insuffi‐
cient. In our study of the impact of Brexit on UK agricul‐
tural policies, we expand further the conceptual frame‐
work they set in four ways (Dobbs et al., 2021).
First, although Ansell and Trondal (2018) focus on
vertical examples of scalar turbulence, the impacts can
also be felt horizontally (Dobbs et al., 2021). This reflects
broader notions of multilevel governance (Hooghe &
Marks, 2003) and institutional interplay (Oberthür &
Stokke, 2011). Here, early responses to Covid‐19 in
Europe where national governments each went their
separate ways, undermining both an EU‐wide response
but also their neighbours’ own responses, created a par‐
ticularly acute example of both horizontal and vertical
scalar turbulence (Dobbs, 2020). The different levels of
EU competences across policy areas (or lack thereof) and
the policy‐cycle, alongside the sometimes‐fraught rela‐
tionships between “Brussels” and some member states,
make scalar turbulence particularly likely.
Second, we identified the possibility of a new, fourth
form of “policy turbulence.” This entails where there is
substantial policy conflict or incoherence, e.g., due to
multiple related policies in conflict, a substantive policy
gap, or potentially a new policy that is exceptionally inno‐
vative or overhauls the regime. In the case of Brexit and
agriculture, this was primarily through the loss of the CAP.
Third, categorisation of turbulence is not fixed and
depends on the focus of study. Thus, depending on what
part of the system is studied, a different categorisation
ormapping of turbulencemay be done: A study on policy
divergence at regional level may consider vertical scalar
turbulence—how their decision‐making is constrained
by policy choices made at higher levels of governance
without considering their needs—more important, while
an analysis of state responses may be more concerned
with horizontal turbulence and the impact of decisions
made by their neighbours. Furthermore, in our Brexit
and agriculture example, losing the CAP may be policy
turbulence for agriculture stakeholders but considered
as contributing more to a generic environmental turbu‐
lence for green groups.
Finally, while it is useful to identify different forms of
turbulence, they are not independent from each other.
Instead, turbulence can be transversal in nature (build‐
ing on the interdependence between levels posited by
Ansell & Trondal, 2018). Thus, at the very least, resources
spent responding to one form of turbulence are not
available for responding to others, stretching admin‐
istrative and political capacity. But more fundamen‐
tally, responding to one form of turbulence can worsen
another, for example the UK hastening to “get Brexit
done” and address environmental turbulence has come
at the cost of higher organisational turbulence for busi‐
nesses exporting to the EU and scalar turbulence, evi‐
denced by growing distrust between Westminster and
the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland (Dobbs et al., 2021).
3.3. Transforming to Govern With Turbulence
Upon identifying sources of turbulence, policy actors
must then determine how to respond. In order to gov‐
ern with turbulence, something truly transformative is
necessary (Ansell et al., 2020, p. 2)—butwhat does trans‐
formative look like?
From a governance perspective, Ansell et al. (2020)
put forward “robust governance” conceptualised as:
The ability of one or more decision‐makers to uphold
or realise a public agenda, function, or value in the
face of the challenge and stress from turbulent events
and processes through the flexible adaptation, agile
modification, and pragmatic redirection of gover‐
nance solutions. (p. 5; emphasis added)
The focus is on change, resilience, and dynamism. It also
fundamentally centres on effectiveness, reflected in the
idea that it is the “ability… to uphold or realize a
public agenda, function or value,” i.e., to deliver con‐
crete change.
Alternatively, from a policy perspective this means
developing policy that is “durable by design” (Jordan
& Moore, 2020), “that endures and is influential over
a particularly long period of time” and that has “the
capacity to ride out the inevitable political bumps in the
road that lies ahead without diminishing their effective‐
ness” (Jordan & Moore, 2020, p. 5). Thus, the aim is to
develop policies able to “ride out” future sources of tur‐
bulence, as yet of indeterminate nature. Both “durable
by design” policies and “robust governance” offer an
ideal of nimble policies and governance arrangements
that can weather turbulence while not losing sight of
their original goal. In practice, this may be delivered with
entirely innovative tools or simply repurposing existing
tools from one regime to another. To this end, lessons
can be learnt, for instance, from literature on manag‐
ing “gridlock” (e.g., Klyza & Sousa, 2013) and on “new
environmental policy instruments” (Moore et al., 2021).
But nimble policy and governance ideals may be hard to
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deliver in practice. While Ansell et al.’s (2020) concept of
robust governance is underpinned by flexible adaptation,
great care is needed as actors governingwith turbulence
also risk losing sight of the original goals, objectives, and
values, with potential knock‐on effects on the long‐term
governance structures and regimes.
Turbulence literature stresses the need to consider
turbulence holistically (taking into account its pervasive,
long‐termnature, themultitude of sources of turbulence
and their transversality), and develop responses to turbu‐
lence accordingly in order to avoid displacing the prob‐
lem. But this is extremely difficult for policymakers to
do in practice—as evidenced by Ansell et al.’s different
dilemmas and the potential dealignment between val‐
ues, policy agendas, and governance functions (Ansell
et al., 2020; Ansell & Trondal, 2018). This parallels with
Rhinard’s (2019) crisification, where he describes politi‐
cians being faced with “real choices with consequences”
or even facing “tragic choices” in a time‐pressured con‐
text of crises (p. 11)—turbulence does not necessarily
necessitate the same rushed responses, but this does
not mean they do not occur or that difficult choices
do not arise. In practice, governments tend to prioritise
responding to one form of turbulence over another, or
prioritising, for example, agenda or functions over value.
This may be due to downplaying certain forms of turbu‐
lence, a lack of tools to target different forms of turbu‐
lence simultaneously, or consciously choosing what is, at
least in the short term, the lesser evil: to live and fight
(another form of turbulence) another day.
4. Mapping Green Deal Turbulence
The EGD—both the communication and the overar‐
ching legislative and administrative agenda for the
von der Leyen Commission—can be analysed as the
Commission’s attempt at responding to turbulence and
developing a nimble policy, durable by design which
would allow the EU to become the first carbon‐neutral
“continent” by 2050. But, as expected, the ground keeps
shifting under EU decision‐makers. In the process of
delivering the EGD legislative commitments, the EU
faces four interconnected forms of turbulence, with
some pre‐existing sources and some more recent like
the Covid‐19 pandemic. Furthermore, the EGD itself
becomes a source of turbulence for other policy areas.
How the EU, and the Commission in particular, navigates
each of these will determine whether the EGD is suc‐
cessful or whether, like many EU long‐term strategies
from the Lisbon Strategy to the SustainableDevelopment
Strategies, it fails to deliver and loses sight of its objec‐
tives (Steurer, 2021).
4.1. Organisational Turbulence
Organisational turbulence is exemplified by the appoint‐
ment of the entire von der Leyen Commission in 2019,
which faced multiple obstacles and was central to
the EGD’s creation. The election of the president of
the Commission was not an easy task. The European
Parliament (hereafter Parliament) shortlisted its pre‐
ferred candidates but the European Council (hereafter
Council) ignored its selection and the heads of govern‐
ment proposed their own nominee (Hennessy, 2019).
Von der Leyen secured her current position by a nar‐
row margin of nine votes in front of the Parliament
(383 votes, where 374 were required). This weakened
her position from the outset and could lead to diffi‐
culties in successfully passing legislation through the
Parliament—including legislation central to furthering
the EGD. Beyond the Commission, the decision by Viktor
Orban to preventively take his party Fidesz out of the
European People’s Party within the Parliament (after the
European People’s Party finally changed its internal rules
tomake it easier to exclude Fidesz) is shifting the balance
of power within the Parliament in uncertain directions
(Votewatch Europe, 2021).
However, von der Leyen also contributed to organi‐
sational turbulence—at least temporarily—through two
key election promises: first, to provide the Parliament
with the right of initiative of legislation that would end
themonopoly of the Commission and shift the balance of
powers between the institutions; second, to proceed to
full co‐decision for the Parliament (and thus move away
from unanimity and consensus) in the areas of climate,
energy, social, and taxation policies. Such changes could
enable Members of the Parliament to put forward pro‐
posals that push for an even greener EU agenda, reflect‐
ing the 2019 “green turn” or wave in the Parliament and
the growing recognition by EU citizens of the importance
of environmental matters. Although attitudes vary con‐
siderably across issues—e.g., with the greatest consen‐
sus on the significance of climate change, in contrast
for instance with noise pollution—the majority of those
surveyed by the Commission in 2017 considered that
environmental protection was very important and 94%
considered it important (European Commission, 2017).
As well as impacting upon the institutions’ relationships,
this could either support the EGD by providing it with
greater democratic underpinnings or indicate that it is
not ambitious enough.
4.2. Environmental Turbulence
Environmental turbulence has been central in both driv‐
ing and delaying the EGD. As noted, the green wave
across Europe and especially in the Parliament had
considerable effects and von der Leyen made differ‐
ent promises to multiple EU political parties reflected
in ambitious political guidelines and the EGD (von der
Leyen, 2019). Whilst the manifold, eclectic promises
may create further challenges (see “Policy Turbulence”
in Sub‐Section 4.3), the existing turbulence was the
impetus for an innovative, highly ambitious (at times)
policy. Beyond the Parliament, growing pressure from
activists—Greta Thunberg and the Fridays for Future
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climate marches—and their willingness to both engage
and publicly criticise the EU for inaction, has the poten‐
tial to take key policy debates about the EGD beyond the
Brussels bubble and spur ambition.
But environmental turbulence has also hampered
EGD development. Repeated delays on the Brexit
negotiations pushed back Commission approval and
delayed the launch of the EGD, before Covid‐19 tem‐
porarily derailed all political plans—impacting on lives,
economies, political relationships, and political priori‐
ties. Although public health, the environment, and the
economy are clearly interlinked and dependent on each
other in the long‐term, they have been portrayed as a
dichotomy (Georgieva & Adhanom Ghebreyesus, 2020).
Adopting yet again such a dichotomic approach regard‐
ing Covid‐19 vis‐à‐vis other focuses, including the EGD,
forces black and white choices upon the public and
decision‐makers rather than finding positive, beneficial
solutions towards a green recovery such as developing
green jobs or nature‐based solutions to environmental
problems and pollution (WWF, 2020). The nature of this
false dichotomy was eventually recognised by the EU
(Dupont et al., 2020), which arguably utilised this specific
ongoing turbulence to help further the EGD by shifting
the focus to a green recovery.
Euroscepticism within and beyond the EU is under‐
mining the chances of the EGD to attain its full poten‐
tial. Externally, Brexit is dampening the moods on both
sides of the Channel, where the issue around a level
playing field in environmental, food, and animal wel‐
fare standards proved one of the pinch points for the
EU/UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Internally,
Eurosceptic member of the Parliament tend to reject
climate and energy policies, and the Visegrád group
(Poland, Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia) frequently calls
for less ambition to avoid carbon leakage (businesses
moving away from the EU to countries with laxer climate
policies) and impacts on competitiveness (Zapletalová &
Komínková, 2020). While this is not new, it is becom‐
ing more consequential. After years of environment and
climate action being side‐lined at the EU level (Čavoški,
2015), and thus this sharp East/West divide happening
in an area of relatively low political salience, it is now the
flagship policy issue for a Commission whose (as of yet
limited) efforts on rule of law put it in direct confronta‐
tion with Poland and Hungary.
4.3. Policy Turbulence
Mainstreaming is one of three procedural themes of the
EGD—both an old debate at the EU level (treaty com‐
mitments to environmental policy integration date back
to the 1980s) and still very much a live issue. The last
20 years saw a narrowing down of environmental pol‐
icy integration into climate policy integration—for exam‐
ple the EU’s previous long‐term strategy’s (Europe 2020,
adopted in 2010) environmental objective of sustainable
growth largely had a climate and energy focus, omit‐
ting most environmental issues (Steurer, 2021). The EGD
adopts amuchwider scope on environmental policy inte‐
gration and brings back to the top of the EU agenda both
broad environmental issues (including biodiversity) and
other policy areas (agriculture), which had been periph‐
eral to EU long‐term strategies (Lisbon and Europe 2020
Strategies) and either forgotten or inured from the type
of changes required of other policy areas. The EGD gives
teeth to mainstreaming—both through its “fit for 55”
agenda of evaluating existing legislation (whether they
are fit to support the EU in reaching its 2030 target)
and in one other of the EGD seven substantive themes,
explicitly focused on greening the CAP. But the 2021
CAP reform demonstrates that these teeth are not sharp
enough. The von der Leyen Commission introduced the
EGD without removing and rewriting the CAP reform
proposal produced under the Juncker Commission, argu‐
ing that it could be coherent with the EGD if the leg‐
islators not only maintained, but raised its ambition.
However, environmental ambition in CAP reforms tends
to be reduced, not increased by both the Parliament
and the Council (Gravey & Buzogány, 2021), and 2021’s
trilogue confirms this trend. Thus, while in December
2019 it appeared that the EGD could potentially disrupt
(at least from an environmental/sustainability perspec‐
tive) the CAP reform process, the opposite has unfolded
with the Council weakening CAP greening ambitions and
widening the gap between the CAP and the EGD (Fortuna
& Foote, 2021).
4.4. Scalar Turbulence
Scalar turbulence, beyond those sources that overlap
with environmental turbulence, remains largely in wait‐
ing to‐date and will most likely manifest when it comes
to the gradual implementation of the EGD and related
policies, due to the roles of the EU and the mem‐
ber states. Many of the areas integral to the EGD,
including the environment and agriculture, are shared
competences between the EU and the member states.
Interestingly, in the next CAP increased responsibility will
be placed on the member states to deliver the goals of
the EGD. The partial repatriation of the CAP could lead
to greater intra‐EU divergence, fuelling both horizontal
and vertical turbulence as less ambitious member states
undermine their more ambitious neighbours (Matthews,
2021). Such repatriation may nevertheless provide an
opportunity for the Commission to green the CAP a pos‐
teriori: All new National Strategic Plans for disbursing
CAP funding will need to be graded against EGD commit‐
ments as part of approval process by the Commission.
4.5. Confirming the Transversal Character of Turbulence
These four forms of turbulence interact demonstrating
the transversal nature of turbulence: e.g., CAP fund‐
ing is used to support friends and leaders of member
states experiencing democratic backsliding—from Czech
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President Babis being one of Czechia’s biggest CAP recip‐
ients creating a conflict of interest (Wanat, 2020), to the
links between CAP funding and regime allies in Hungary
uncovered by New York Times journalists (Gebrekidan
et al., 2019). This reflects what Kelemen calls the EU’s
“autocracy trap,” whereby EU funding with few strings
attached is used to strengthen its opponents (Kelemen,
2020, p. 481). In challenging the CAP, the EGD there‐
fore not only creates policy turbulence, it challenges
this autocracy trap and contributes to organisational and
environmental turbulence.
5. Governing the EGD Through Turbulence:
An Assessment of Difficult Choices
Identification of turbulence is only half the battle. The EU
must now seek to respond to turbulence to avoid the
obstacles it poses and take advantage of the opportuni‐
ties it provides. Returning to the framework, this begs
two questions: first, whether there are appropriate tools
and pathways open to the EU; and second, whether the
European Commission is availing of these in a robust and
holistic manner to deliver transformative change.
On the first, a multitude of pathways exists in the EU,
whether at the EU level or internally within the member
states. For instance, soft law (e.g., guidance documents
and policy papers) may be availed of in lieu of hard law
(Eliantonio et al., 2021); funding with conditions may be
offered as an incentive, rather than creating prohibitions
with associated penalties; public‐private agreementsmay
be developed; networks may be cultivated; corporate
social responsibility may be supported; and policies may
be either centralised or de‐centralised. A wide range of
“new environmental policy instruments” exists within the
EU (Moore et al., 2021). However, the availability of mea‐
sures does not guarantee their suitability or uptake in a
manner to achieve governance with turbulence.
On the second, the EGD is a good first step, as it
takes innovative approaches and could be truly transfor‐
mative. However, its development and implementation
must continue to be transformative to address ongoing
turbulence and it must do so in a more holistic manner.
Unfortunately, the EU appears to have fallen into the pit‐
fall of siloed approaches; while the EGD has a very wide
scope, it will be delivered through a number of strate‐
gies, some of which are narrow in scope (e.g., greening
the CAP, the Farm to Fork Strategy, and the Biodiversity
Strategy) and may drift further apart through the legisla‐
tive process (as the CAP and the Farm to Fork Strategy
are currently doing). Further, and linked at times to siloed
approaches, the EU has made policy decisions that have
entailed various forms of prioritisation with significant
consequences as demonstrated in Sub‐Section 5.1.
5.1. Prioritisation in Practice
Prioritisation rests on a gamble that the problem cre‐
ated or left by the chosen solution is smaller and eas‐
ier to tackle than the original problem. Examples include
(1) the prioritisation of one area over another and
addressing policy turbulence over scalar turbulence in
the context of the CAP; (2) the prioritisation of functions
over agenda in responding to Covid‐19; and (3) the pri‐
oritisation of functions and agenda over values in agree‐
ing the Next Generation EU and 2021–2027 Multiannual
Financial Framework plans in the Council.
The first example highlights the potential conse‐
quences of both prioritising one area (the CAP) over
another (Farm to Fork, and the EGD more generally)
and addressing one form of turbulence (policy) over
another (scalar). Greening the CAP has until now yielded
few environmental gains, with soil degradation, habi‐
tats loss, and water pollution continuing (Alons, 2017;
European Environment Agency, 2020). The proposed use
of National Strategic Plans in the new CAP, with a repa‐
triation of policy development, can be seen as the use
of an alternative pathway (repatriation) to allow at least
some member states to further green their farming
sector. In pursuing such an approach, the EU (and in
particular the Commission) is trying to avoid being (yet
again) scapegoated for policy failure. However, it is effec‐
tively shifting responsibility (Fouilleux&Gravey, in press),
and delegating the task of ensuring that the new CAP
strengthens the Farm to Fork initiative and overall EGD
to national governments—thereby also risking its failure.
Thus, that the Council is pushing for lowering the
threshold of CAP payments ring‐fenced for environment
and climate action is not encouraging on its own (Fortuna
& Foote, 2021) but also due to what it means for the
likely success of two other EGD strategies, the Farm to
Fork and Biodiversity Strategies. The Farm to Fork strat‐
egy focuses on a holistic approach towards the sustain‐
ability of food systems with an emphasis on sustainable
food production, sustainable food consumption, food
loss and waste prevention, as well as sustainable food
processing and distribution. A key aspect of the Strategy
includes the reduction by 2030 of the use of more haz‐
ardous pesticides by 50% (European Commission, 2021).
However, this ambitious target will be difficult to meet,
as the French experience of Ecophyto illustrates. Created
in 2008, the Ecophyto plans set high ambitious regula‐
tory targets for pesticides reduction. However, theywere
running alongside a CAP whose payments were pushing
farmers in another direction and France repeatedly failed
to meet its targets, with pesticide use increasing instead
(Petetin et al., 2019). Ecophyto failures illustrate the cen‐
tral role of the CAP in changing farming practices and
how the future CAP could undermine the whole land‐
use and biodiversity sections of the EGD. Whether the
Commission, when negotiating one‐on‐one with each
member state on their plans, manages to deliver bet‐
ter EGD complementarity remains to be seen. Critically,
the new CAP therefore risks fuelling scalar turbulence,
both vertically between the member states and the EU,
if the Commission strictly polices the content of these
national plans, and horizontally between member states
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opting for very different levels of ambition leading to a
more uneven level playing field across the EU. It also risks
increasing policy turbulence for the EGD, through creat‐
ing internal conflicts.
The second example of prioritisation—relating
to potential conflicts between policy agendas and
functions—is exemplified by the EU response to
Covid‐19. The EU has limited competence in health
policy—it remains with the member states. Initially, the
EU was very hesitant to act regarding Covid‐19, despite
its impacts on the EU’s policies directly and indirectly
(through for instance member states’ actions), including
on the freemovement of goods and persons—respecting
the functions over the public agenda (Purnhagen et al.,
2020). It limited itself to actions such as the public pro‐
curement of personal protection and other medical
equipment. However, over time, the continuing turbu‐
lence and knock‐on impacts motivated the EU to fur‐
ther action, through proposing EU‐wide approaches to
exiting lockdowns, travel restrictions, funding, and vac‐
cines. Nonetheless, in doing so, the EU has attempted to
restrict itself to either unanimous decisions or soft mea‐
sures, thereby still respecting its overall functions. A con‐
cern would be that the EU would overly restrict itself
in developing and implementing the EGD, e.g., due to it
being an area of shared competence and not exclusive
EU competence, or through seeking to appease member
states or other EU institutions.
A third example of prioritisation—this time deliver‐
ing a policy agenda and functions over values—is the
budget compromise negotiated by the German presi‐
dency of the Council in December 2020. Hungary and
Poland accepted to withdraw their veto to the new
budgetary package (Multiannual Financial Framework
2021–2027 and Next Generation EU) as long as the new
rule of lawmechanisms, which would enable the suspen‐
sion of disbursement of EU funds in case of corruption or
other failures to meet rule of law criteria, would not be
used until Hungary and Poland have had the opportunity
to challenge the rule in front of the Court of Justice of the
EU and get a verdict (Bayer, 2020). This pushes back the
actual application of the rule of lawmechanism, perhaps
for years—as the Hungarian and Polish governments can
first take their time to start the annulment procedure
and second because the Court of Justice is not renowned
for its swiftness. This compromise prioritised getting the
budget through and financing the EU’s post‐Covid recov‐
ery over standing up for the rule of law—echoing ear‐
lier choices of the EU to de‐prioritise the rule of law and
human rights (Kelemen, 2020).
Whether these gambles will pay off remains unclear.
Prioritisation is a normal component of policymaking,
but turbulence exacerbates the situation—uncertainty
pervades, numerous issues need to be addressed simul‐
taneously, and responses may create further turbulence
or not bring the expected outcomes. Irrespective of
results, for the EGD to be truly transformative, a more
holistic, robust response should be taken where possi‐
ble and these choices should be open for political debate
and require clear justification.
6. Conclusions
The world is becoming increasingly turbulent, exempli‐
fied within the EU today by the accumulation of events
such as Brexit, the Covid‐19 pandemic, the Green Wave,
conflicts over the rule of law, and significant policy over‐
hauls including the ongoing reform of the CAP and the
EGD itself. The EGD is simultaneously a source of and
response to turbulence but crucially, for the purposes of
this article and thematic issue, also operateswithin a con‐
text of turbulence.
This article built upon the work of Ansell and
co‐authors (2016, 2018, 2020) to develop an enhanced
conceptual framework. Ansell et al. initially identified
three central forms of turbulence: organisational, envi‐
ronmental, and scalar. This article broadened scalar
turbulence to encompass also horizontal turbulence
(alongside vertical turbulence). It also demonstrated
the existence of a fourth form of turbulence—policy
turbulence—reflected in the introduction of fundamen‐
tally new policies such as the EGD, or the inherent con‐
flict between policies or prongs of an individual policy
such as with the CAP. It further expanded Ansell and
Trondal’s (2018) reflection on the connections between
turbulence at different levels, showing how turbulence
can be transversal—different forms of turbulence, and
responses to these, fuel new forms of turbulence.
This article developed a conceptual framework for
this thematic issue by operationalizing what turbulence
means for delivering and implementing the EGD and the
challenges policy actors, notably the Commission, face in
governing with and not against turbulence. Turbulence
brings new challenges and opportunities, as it forces
actors to look beyond the status quo and think out‐
side the box. If the Commission and other actors seek‐
ing to implement the EGD simply continue as normal,
then the deal risks stalling and being undermined, for
example through being derailed by Covid‐19, blocked
by Hungary and Poland, weakened by the failing legit‐
imacy of the EU or the Commission, or pushed down
the priority list by future incidents. Responses to turbu‐
lence, including prioritization, may increase turbulence
and lead to undesirable outcomes. On the other hand,
the EGD itself demonstrates the potential for turbulence
to help instigate, develop, and implement innovative and
future‐facing policies. To achieve this, policy actors must
acknowledge and address the turbulence they face; they
must learn to govern with turbulence and, to this end,
undertake transformative actions in a holistic manner.
Overall, the article highlighted the significance of
governing with turbulence, the need for durability and
robustness, and key concerns in operationalizing this.
Great care is needed by policy actors in identifying the
sources of turbulence, their impacts, and what mecha‐
nisms or pathways might enable them to steer a way to
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a robust response. This does not necessitate the eradi‐
cation of all turbulence—turbulence is not an “evil” in
and of itself—but simply reflective thinking to see how
best to respond. Ansell and co‐authors (2016, 2018)
discussed how a “good” decision for a level could be
“bad” for another. Our exploration of turbulence and
the EGD revealed a murkier picture, where EU decision‐
makers struggle to identify any universally “good” deci‐
sions. Eschewing the arguably high bar of transformative,
holistic responses to turbulence, EU leaders make prob‐
lematic gambles—for instance hard decisions are passed
to lower levels of governance, or, as with the rule of law
mechanism, further delayed.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Claire Dupont and
Diarmuid Torney for leading this thematic issue and pro‐
viding expert guidance; participants of the workshop for
their feedback and the three anonymous reviewers for
their useful comments; and Daniel Lynch for advice on
the last version.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Alons, G. (2017). Environmental policy integration in
the EU’s common agricultural policy: Greening
or greenwashing? Journal of European Public Pol‐
icy, 24(11), 1604–1622. https://doi.org/10.1080/
13501763.2017.1334085
Ansell, C. K., Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2020). The
Covid‐19 pandemic as a game changer for public
administration and leadership? The need for robust
governance responses to turbulent problems. Pub‐
lic Management Review, 23(7), 949–960. https://doi.
org/10.1080/14719037.2020.1820272
Ansell, C. K., & Trondal, J. (2018). Governing turbulence:
An organizational‐institutional agenda. Perspectives
on Public Management and Governance, 1(1), 43–57.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ppmgov/gvx013
Ansell, C. K., Trondal, J., & Øgård, M. (2016). Turbulent
governance. In C. K. Ansell, J. Trondal, & M. Øgård
(Eds.), Governance in turbulent times (pp. 1–33).
Oxford University Press.
Bayer, L. (2020, December 9). EU budget plan lets




Bürgin, A. (2020). The impact of Juncker’s reorganiza‐
tion of the European Commission on the internal
policy‐making process: Evidence from the energy
union project. Public Administration, 98(2), 378–391.
https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12388
Burns, C., Gravey, V., Jordan, A., & Zito, A. (2019). De‐
Europeanising or disengaging? EU environmental pol‐
icy and Brexit. Environmental Politics, 28(2), 271–292.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2019.1549774
Cameron, K. S., Kim,M. U., &Whetten, D. A. (1987). Orga‐
nizational effects of decline and turbulence. Adminis‐
trative Science Quarterly, 32(2), 222–240.
Čavoški, A. (2015). A post‐austerity European Commis‐
sion: No role for environmental policy? Environmen‐
tal Politics, 24(3), 501–505.
Dobbs, M. (2020). National governance of public health
responses in a pandemic? European Journal of
Risk Regulation, 11(2), 240–248. https://doi.org/
10.1017/err.2020.39
Dobbs, M., Gravey, V., & Petetin, L. (2021). The turbu‐
lent development of agricultural policies post‐Brexit.




Dupont, C., Oberthür, S., & von Homeyer, I. (2020).
The Covid‐19 crisis: A critical juncture for EU cli‐
mate policy development? Journal of European Inte‐
gration, 42(8), 1095–1110. https://doi.org/10.1080/
07036337.2020.1853117
Eliantonio, M., Korkea‐aho, E., & Stefan, O. (Eds.). (2021).
EU soft law in member states: Theoretical findings
and empirical evidence. Hart Publishing.
European Commission. (2017). Special eurobarometer
468: Attitudes of European citizens towards the
environment [Data set]. data.europa.eu. https://
data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2156_88_
1_468_ENG
European Commission. (2019a). Annex to the Euro‐
pean Green Deal. https://eur‐lex.europa.eu/legal‐
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0640&
from=EN
European Commission. (2019b). The European Green
Deal (COM(2019) 640 final). https://ec.europa.eu/
info/sites/info/files/european‐green‐deal‐
communication_en.pdf
European Commission. (2021). Farm to fork strategy.
https://ec.europa.eu/food/horizontal‐topics/farm‐
fork‐strategy_en
European Environment Agency. (2020). The European
environment: State and outlook 2020—Knowledge
for transition to a sustainable Europe. https://www.
eea.europa.eu/soer‐2020
Falkner, G. (2016). The EU’s current crisis and its policy
effects: Research design and comparative findings.
Journal of European Integration, 38(3), 219–235.
Fortuna, G., & Foote, N. (2021, May 28). CAP talks




Fouilleux, E., & Gravey, V. (in press). The common agricul‐
tural policy. In M. Cini & N. Pérez‐Solorzano Borragan
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 316–326 324
(Eds.), European Union politics (7th ed.). Oxford Uni‐
versity Press.
Gebrekidan, S., Apuzzo, M., & Novak, B. (2019, Novem‐
ber 3). The money farmers: How oligarchs and pop‐
ulists milk the EU for millions. The New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/03/world/
europe/eu‐farm‐subsidy‐hungary.html
Georgieva, K., & Adhanom Ghebreyesus, T. (2020,
April 3). Some say there is a trade‐off: Save lives or




Gravey, V., & Buzogány, A. (2021). For farmers or the envi‐
ronment? The European Parliament in the 2013 CAP
reform. Politics and Governance, 9(3), 16–28.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2014). Monnet’s
error? London School of Economics.
Hennessy, A. (2019, July 17). Ursula von der Leyen:
Why controversial choice for EU top job may actu‐




Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2003). Unraveling the cen‐
tral state, but how? Types of multi‐level governance
(Working Paper No. 87). IHS Political Science Series.
Jordan, A., & Moore, B. (2020). Durable by design? Pol‐
icy feedback in a changing climate. Cambridge Uni‐
versity Press.
Kassim, H., Peterson, J., Bauer, M. W., Connolly, S.,
Dehousse, R., Hooghe, L., & Thompson, A. (2013).
The European Commission of the twenty‐first century.
Oxford University Press.
Kelemen, R. D. (2020). The European Union’s authori‐
tarian equilibrium. Journal of European Public Policy,
27(3), 481–499. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.
2020.1712455
Klyza, C., & Sousa, D. (2013). American environmental
policy beyond gridlock (2nd ed.). MIT Press.
Laffan, B., O’Donnell, R., & Smith, M. (2000). Europe’s
experimental union. Routledge.
Matthews, A. (2021, February 26). Improving gov‐
ernance of the future CAP. Cap Reform. http://
capreform.eu/improving‐governance‐of‐the‐future‐
cap
Moore, B., Benson, D., Jordan, A., Wurzel, R. K. W., &
Zito, A. (2021). Governing with multiple policy instru‐
ments? In A. Jordan & V. Gravey (Eds.), Environmen‐
tal policy in the EU actors, institutions, and processes
(pp. 299–316). Routledge.
Oberthür, S., Görlach, B., Bart, I., Księżopolski, K., Barata,
P., & Nesbit, M. (2016). The EU in turbulence: What
are the implications for EU climate and energy policy?
Ecologic. http://ecologic.eu/14129
Oberthür, S., & Stokke, O. S. (2011). Institutional interac‐
tion in global environmental change. In S. Oberthür
& O. S. Stokke (Eds.), Managing institutional com‐
plexity: Regime interplay and global environmental
change (pp. 1–23). MIT Press.
Petetin, L., Gravey, V., & Moore, B. (2019). Green Brexit:
Setting the bar for a green Brexit in food and
farming. The Soil Association. https://www.brexit
environment.co.uk/wp‐content/uploads/dlm_
uploads/2019/06/SoilAssociationFull.pdf
Purnhagen, K. P., de Ruijter, A., Flear, M. L., Hervey, T.
K., & Herwig, A. (2020). More competences than you
knew? The web of health competence for European
Union action in response to the Covid‐19 outbreak.
European Journal of Risk Regulation, 11(2), 297–306.
https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2020.35
Rhinard, M. (2019). The crisisification of policy‐making
in the European Union. Journal of Common Market
Studies, 57(3), 616–633. https://doi.org/10.1111/
jcms.12838
Saurugger, S. (2014). Europeanisation in times of crisis.
Political Studies Review, 12(2), 181–192. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1478‐9302.12052
Steurer, R. (2021). Is the EU still committed to develop‐
ing more sustainably? In A. Jordan & V. Gravey (Eds.),
Environmental policy in the EU actors, institutions,
and processes (pp. 279–298). Routledge.
von der Leyen, U. (2019). A Union that strives for more:
My agenda for Europe. Political guidelines for the




Votewatch Europe. (2021, March 3). Impact of
EPP‐Fidesz divorce to be bigger than expected.
https://www.votewatch.eu/blog/impact‐of‐epp‐
fidesz‐divorce‐to‐be‐bigger‐than‐expected
Wanat, Z. (2020, December 7). Czech PM Babiš faces
long road after EU audit. Politico. https://www.
politico.eu/article/commission‐audit‐spells‐long‐
road‐ahead‐for‐czech‐pm‐babis
WWF. (2020). Nature hires: How nature‐based solu‐
tions can power a green jobs recovery. https://
wwfint.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/nature_
hires_report_wwf_ilo.pdf
Yun, S., Lee, J., & Lee, S. (2019). Technology development
strategies and policy support for the solar energy
industry under technological turbulence. Energy Pol‐
icy, 124, 206–214. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.
2018.09.003
Zapletalová, V., & Komínková, M. (2020). Who is fighting
against the EU’s energy and climate policy in the Euro‐
pean Parliament? The contribution of the Visegrad
Group. Energy Policy, 139. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.enpol.2020.111326
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 316–326 325
About the Authors
Mary Dobbs is a lecturer in the Department of Law in Maynooth University, Ireland. She previously
worked in Queen’s University Belfast and remains a visiting fellow in the School of Law there. She spe‐
cialises in environmental law and governance, especially regarding Brexit, environmental principles,
agriculture, and genetically modified crops.
Viviane Gravey is a lecturer in European politics at the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy,
and Politics atQueen’sUniversity Belfast, where she co‐chairs the Brexit & Environment network, inves‐
tigating the impact of Brexit on the UK and EU environment. She holds a PhD from the University of
East Anglia. Her research focuses on the ambition and governance of environmental and agricultural
policies in the UK and at EU level.
Ludivine Petetin is a senior lecturer in law at the School of Law and Politics of Cardiff University. Her
expertise lies in agri‐environmental‐food issues and international trade as well as the challenges that
Brexit and Covid‐19 pose to these areas. She regularly engages with governments, legislatures, and
stakeholders across the UK on these matters.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 316–326 326
